實驗經濟學一：行為賽局論

Experimental Economics I: Behavioral Game Theory

第八講：多層次思考

Lecture 8:Level-k Reasoning

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本課程指定教材: Colin E. Camerer, *Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation; New Jersey: Princeton UP, 2003.

Outline

- Introduction: Initial Deviations from MSE
  - Hide-and-Seek: Crawford & Iriberri (AER07)
  - Initial Joker Effect: Re-asssess O’Neil (1987)
- Simultaneous Dominant Solvable Games
  - Price competition: Capra et al (IER 2002)
  - Traveler's dilemma: Capra et al (AER 1999)
  - *p*-BC game: Nagel (AER 95), CHW (AER 98)
- Level-k Theory:
  - Stahl-Wilson (GEB1995), CGCB (ECMA2001)
  - Costa-Gomes & Crawford (AER 2006)

Hide-and-Seek Games w/ Non-neutral Location Framing

- RTH: Rubinstein & Tversky (1993); Rubinstein, Tversky, & Heller (1996); Rubinstein (1998,1999)
- Your opponent has hidden a prize in one of four boxes arranged in a row.
- The boxes are marked as shown below: A, B, A, A.

A	B	A	A

Hide-and-Seek Games w/ Non-neutral Location Framing

- RTH (Continued):
- Your goal is, of course, to find the prize.
- His goal is that you will not find it.
- You are allowed to open only one box.
- Which box are you going to open?

A	B	A	A

Hide-and-Seek Games w/ Non-neutral Location Framing

- Folk Theory: "…in Lake Wobegon, the correct answer is usually 'c'."
  - – Garrison Keillor (1997) on multiple-choice tests
- Comment on the poisoning of Ukrainian's presidential candidate (now president):
- "Any government wanting to kill an opponent …would not try it at a meeting with government officials."
  - – Viktor Yushchenko, quoted in Chivers (2004)

Hide-and-Seek Games w/ Non-neutral Location Framing

- B is distinguished by its label
- The two end A may be inherently salient
- This gives the central A location its own brand of uniqueness as the least salient location



Hide-and-Seek Games w/ Non-neutral Location Framing

- RTH's game has a unique equilibrium, in which both players randomize uniformly
- Expected payoffs: Hider 3/4, Seeker 1/4

Hider/Seeker	A	B	A	A
A	0,1	1,0	1,0	1,0
B	1,0	0,1	1,0	1,0
A	1,0	1,0	0,1	1,0
A	1,0	1,0	1,0	0,1

Hide-and-Seek Games w/ Non-neutral Location Framing

- All Treatments in RTH:
- Baseline: ABAA (Treasure Treatment)
- Variants:
  - Left-Right Reverse: AABA
  - Labeling: 1234 (2 is like B, 3 is like central A)
- Mine Treatments
  - Hider hides a mine in 1 location, and Seeker wants to avoid the mine (payoffs reversed)
  - mine hiders = seekers, mine seekers = hiders

Hide-and-Seek Games: Aggregate Results of RTH

RTH-4	**A**	***B***	**A**	**A**
Hider (53)	9%	36%	40%	15%
Seeker (62)	13%	31%	45%	11%
RT-AABA-Treasure	**A**	**A**	***B***	**A**
Hider (189)	22%	35%	19%	25%
Seeker (85)	13%	51%	21%	15%
RT-AABA-Mine	**A**	**A**	***B***	**A**
Hider (132)	24%	39%	18%	18%
Seeker (73)	29%	36%	14%	22%
RT-1234-Treasure	**1**	***2***	**3**	**4**
Hider (187)	25%	22%	36%	18%
Seeker (84)	20%	18%	48%	14%
RT-1234-Mine	**1**	***2***	**3**	**4**
Hider (133)	18%	20%	44%	17%
Seeker (72)	19%	25%	36%	19%
R-ABAA	**A**	***B***	**A**	**A**
Hider (50)	16%	18%	44%	22%
Seeker (64)	16%	19%	54%	11%

Player roles reversed

Different locations for B

2 analogous to B

Hide-and-Seek Games: Aggregate Results of RTH

RTH-4	**A**	***B***	**A**	**A**
Hider (53)	9%	36%	40%	15%
Seeker (62)	13%	31%	45%	11%
RT-AABA-Treasure	**A**	**A**	***B***	**A**
Hider (189)	22%	35%	19%	25%
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Hider (50)	16%	18%	44%	22%
Seeker (64)	16%	19%	54%	11%

Stylized facts

Hide-and-Seek Games: Aggregate Results of RTH

- Can pool data since no significant differences for Seekers ($p = 0.48$) or Hiders ($p = 0.16$)
  - Chi-square Test across 6 different Treatments

	A	**B**	**A**	**A**
Hiders (624)	0.2163	0.2115	**0.3654**	0.2067
Seekers (560)	0.1821	0.2054	**0.4589**	0.1536

Hide-and-Seek Games: Stylized Facts

- **Central A (or 3) is most prevalent for both Hiders and Seekers**
- **Central A is even more prevalent for Seekers (or Hiders in Mine treatments)**
  - As a result, Seekers do better than in equilibrium
- Shouldn't Hiders realize that Seekers will be just as tempted to look there?
- RTH: "The finding that both choosers and guessers selected the least salient alternative suggests little or no strategic thinking."

Hide-and-Seek Games: Explaining Stylized Facts

- Can a strategic theory explain this?
- Heterogeneous population with substantial frequencies of L2 and L3 as well as L1 (estimated 19% L1, 32% L2, 24% L3, 25% L4) can reproduce the stylized facts
- More on Level-k later…
  - Let us first see more evidence in DS Games…

Simultaneous Dominant Solvable Games

- Initial Response vs. Equilibration
- Price Competition
  - Capra, Goeree, Gomez and Holt (IER 2002)
- Traveler's Dilemma
  - Capra, Goeree, Gomez and Holt (AER 1999)
- p-Beauty Contest
  - Nagel (AER 1995)
  - Camerer, Ho, Weigelt (AER 1998)

Price Competition

- Capra, Goeree, Gomez & Holt (IER 2002)
  - Two firms pick prices p_1 & p_2 from $0.60-$1.60
  - Both get $(1+\alpha)^* p_1 / 2$ if tied
- But if $p_1 < p_2$:
  - Low-price firm gets $(1 * p_1)$
  - Other firm gets $(\alpha * p_1)$
- α = responsiveness to *best price* (=0.2/0.8)
  - $\alpha \rightarrow 1$: *Meet-or-release* (low price guarantees)
  - $\alpha < 1$: Bertrand competition predicts lowest price

Price Competition: Data

- Please See the "Figure 5 Average Price by Season" in M.Capra. et al, "Learning and Noisy Equilibrium Behavior in an Experimental Study of Imperfect Price Competition," International Economic Review, Vol.43, No.3, (2002), pp.624.

Price Competition: Simulation

- Please See "Figure 4 Simulated Average Price" in M.Capra. et al, "Learning and Noisy Equilibrium Behavior in an Experimental Study of Imperfect Price Competition," International Economic Review, Vol.43, No.3, (2002), pp.623.

Traveler's Dilemma

- Capra, Goeree, Gomez & Holt (AER 1999)
  - Two travelers state claim p_1 and p_2 : 80-200
  - Airline awards both the minimum claim, but
  - reward R to the one who stated the lower claim
  - penalize the other by R
- Unique NE: race to the bottom

  → lowest claim

  - Like price competition game or *p*-beauty contest

Traveler's Dilemma: Data



FIGURE 1. DATA FOR PART A FOR VARIOUS VALUES OF THE REWARD/PENALTY PARAMETER

p-Beauty Contest Games 選美結果預測實驗

- Each of N players choose x_i from [0,100]
  - 每人選擇 0 到 100 之間的數字，希望最接近「所有數字平均乘以 p 倍」
- Target is p*(average of x_i)
- Closest x_i wins fixed prize
- (67,100] violates 1st order dominance
  - 選擇 67-100 的人是選擇 (一階的) 劣勢策略
- (45, 67] obeys 1 step (not 2) of dominance
  - 選擇 45-67 的人是選擇除去一階劣勢策略後剩下的 (二階) 劣勢策略
- 1st Experiment (最早的實驗): Nagel (AER 1995)

Figure 1A of Nagel (AER 1995): $p = 1/2$



Figure 1B of Nagel (AER 1995): $p = 2/3$



p-Beauty Contest Games 選美結果預測實驗

- Named after Keynes, General Theory (1936)

- **“...professional investment may be likened to those newspaper competitions in which the competitors have to pick out the six prettiest faces from a hundred photographs,**
  （專業投資好比報紙上的選美比賽，要從上百張照片挑出最漂亮的六張）
- **the prize being awarded to the competitor whose choice most nearly corresponds to the average preferences of the competitors as a whole...”**（目標是選擇最接近「平均參賽者會選到的照片」）

p-Beauty Contest Games 選美結果預測實驗

- It is not a case of choosing those [faces] that, to the best of one's judgment, are really the prettiest,
  - 「這不是要挑每個人各自認為最漂亮的 [臉蛋]，
- nor even those that average opinion genuinely thinks the prettiest.
  - 更不是要挑大家公認最漂亮的。
- We have reached the third degree where we devote our intelligences to...
  - 我們已經想到第三層去，

p-Beauty Contest Games 選美結果預測實驗

- **Anticipating what average opinion expects the average opinion to be.**
  - 努力預測一般人心目中認為大家公認最漂亮的會是誰。
- **And there are some, I believe, who practice the fourth, fifth and higher degrees.”**
  - 而且我相信有些人還可以想到第四層、第五層或更高。」
  - Keynes (凱因斯 , 1936, p.156)
- **Follow-up Studies (後續研究)**
  - **Camerer, Ho and Weigelt (AER 1998)**

Camerer, Ho & Weigelt (AER 1998): Design



FIGURE 1A. A FINITE-THRESHOLD GAME, $FT(n)$ = ([100, 200], 1.3, n)

3 rounds of IEDS



FIGURE 1B. AN INFINITE-THRESHOLD GAME, $IT(n)$ = ([0, 100], 0.7, n)

∞ rounds of IEDS

Camerer, Ho & Weigelt (AER 1998): Design

實驗設計

先做有限次
再做無限次
(刪劣勢策
略)做無限次
再做有限次

TABLE 1—THE EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN

每組人數 : 3 vs. 7

	Group size	
	3	7
Finite → Infinite		
	$FT(1.3, 3) \rightarrow IT(0.7, 3)$ (7 groups)	$FT(1.3, 7) \rightarrow IT(0.7, 7)$ (7 groups)
	$FT(1.1, 3) \rightarrow IT(0.9, 3)$ (7 groups)	$FT(1.1, 7) \rightarrow IT(0.9, 7)$ (7 groups)
Infinite → Finite		
	$IT(0.7, 3) \rightarrow FT(1.3, 3)$ (7 groups)	$IT(0.7, 7) \rightarrow FT(1.3, 7)$ (7 groups)
	$IT(0.9, 3) \rightarrow FT(1.1, 3)$ (6 groups)	$IT(0.9, 7) \rightarrow FT(1.1, 7)$ (7 groups)

1.3⊠0.7
1.1⊠0.9
0.7⊠1.3
0.9⊠1.1

Camerer, Ho and Weigelt (AER 1998)

- **RESULT 1:**

  First-period choices are far from equilibrium, and centered near the interval midpoint.

  Choices converge toward the equilibrium point over time.

- Baseline: IT(0.9,7) and IT(0.7, 7)

Camerer, Ho & Weigelt (AER 1998): p=0.9 vs. 0.7

40.5 (L2, D1)

24.5 (L2, D1)



FIGURE 2C. INEXPERIENCED SUBJECTS' CHOICES OVER ROUND IN IT(0.9, 7)



FIGURE 2A. INEXPERIENCED SUBJECTS' CHOICES OVER ROUND IN IT(0.7, 7)

45 (L1, D0)

35 (L1, D0)

"p=0.7" closer to 0

Camerer, Ho and Weigelt (AER 1998)

- IT(0.9,7) vs. IT(0.7, 7)
- **RESULT 2:**

  On average, choices are closer to the equilibrium point

  for games with finite thresholds, and

  for games with p further from 1.

- Infinite vs. Finite…

Camerer, Ho & Weigelt (1998): Finite Thresholds



FIGURE 3A. CHOICES OVER ROUND IN *FT* GAMES PLAYED BY 3-PERSON GROUPS

FT closer to Equilibrium



FIGURE 3B. CHOICES OVER ROUND IN *FT* GAMES PLAYED BY 7-PERSON GROUPS

7-group closer than 3-group

Camerer, Ho and Weigelt (AER 1998)

- **RESULT 3:**

  Choices are closer to equilibrium

  for large (7-person) groups than for small (3-person) groups.

- More on 7-group vs. 3-group…

Camerer, Ho & Weigelt (1998): 7-grp vs. 3-grp

24.5 (L2, D1)



FIGURE 2E. INEXPERIENCED SUBJECTS' CHOICES OVER ROUND IN IT (0.7, 3



FIGURE 2A. INEXPERIENCED SUBJECTS' CHOICES OVER ROUND IN IT (0.7, 7)

35 (L1, D0)

Camerer, Ho & Weigelt (1998):7-grp vs. 3-grp

40.5 (L2, D1)



FIGURE 2G. INEXPERIENCED SUBJECTS' CHOICES OVER ROUND IN $IT(0.9, 3)$



FIGURE 2C. INEXPERIENCED SUBJECTS' CHOICES OVER ROUND IN $IT(0.9, 7)$

45 (L1, D0)

Camerer, Ho and Weigelt (AER 1998)

- **RESULT 4:**

  Choices by [cross-game] experienced subjects are no different than choices by inexperienced subjects in the first round,

  but converge faster to equilibrium

- Inexperienced vs. Experienced…

Camerer, Ho & Weigelt (1998): Exper. vs. Inexper.

24.5 (L2, D1)



FIGURE 2B. EXPERIENCED SUBJECTS' CHOICES OVER ROUND IN $IT(0.7, 7)$



FIGURE 2A. INEXPERIENCED SUBJECTS' CHOICES OVER ROUND IN $IT(0.7, 7)$

35 (L1, D0)

Camerer, Ho & Weigelt (1998): Exper. vs. Inexper.



FIGURE 2D. EXPERIENCED SUBJECTS' CHOICES OVER ROUND IN $IT(0.9, 7)$



FIGURE 2C. INEXPERIENCED SUBJECTS' CHOICES OVER ROUND IN $IT(0.9, 7)$

Camerer, Ho & Weigelt (1998): Exper. vs. Inexper.

24.5 (L2, D1)

35 (L1, D0)



FIGURE 2F. EXPERIENCED SUBJECTS' CHOICES OVER ROUND IN IT(0.7, 3)



FIGURE 2E. INEXPERIENCED SUBJECTS' CHOICES OVER ROUND IN IT(0.7, 3)

Camerer, Ho & Weigelt (1998): Exper. vs. Inexper.

40.5 (L2, D1)



FIGURE 2H. EXPERIENCED SUBJECTS' CHOICES OVER ROUND IN $IT(0.9, 3)$



FIGURE 2G. INEXPERIENCED SUBJECTS' CHOICES OVER ROUND IN $IT(0.9, 3)$

45 (L1, D0)

Camerer, Ho and Weigelt (AER 1998)

- Classification of Types
  - Follow Stahl and Wilson (GEB 1995)
- Level-0: pick randomly from N(μ, σ)
- Level-1: BR to level-0 with noise
- Level-2: BR to level-1 with noise
- Level-3: BR to level-2 with noise
- Estimate type, error using MLE

Camerer, Ho and Weigelt (AER 1998)

TABLE 3—MAXIMUM-LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATES AND LOG-LIKELIHOODS FOR LEVELS OF ITERATED DOMINANCE (FIRST-ROUND DATA ONLY)

Parameter estimates	Out data (groups of 3 or 7)		Nagel's data (groups of 16–18)	
	IT(*p*, *n*)	*FT*(*p*, *n*)	*IT*(0.5, *n*)	*IT*(2/3, *n*)
ω_0	15.93	21.72	45.83 (23.94)	28.36 (13.11)
ω_1	20.74	31.46	37.50 (29.58)	34.33 (44.26)
ω_2	13.53	12.73	16.67 (40.84)	37.31 (39.34)
ω_3	49.50	34.08	0.00 (5.63)	0.00 (3.28)
μ	70.13	100.50	35.53 (50.00)	52.23 (50.00)
σ	28.28	26.89	22.70	14.72
ρ	1.00	1.00	0.24	1.00
$-LL$	1128.29	1057.28	168.48	243.95

Type

Camerer, Ho and Weigelt (AER 1998)

- Robustness checks:
  - High stakes (Fig.1.3 - small effect lowering numbers)
  - Median vs. Mean (Nagel 1999 - same): BGT Figure 5.1
  - p^*(Median+18): Equilibrium is inside
- Subject Pool Variation:
  - Portfolio managers, Econ PhD, Caltech undergrads
  - Caltech Board of Trustees (CEOs)
  - Readers of Financial Times and Expansion
- Experience vs. Inexperience (for the same game)
  - Slonim (EE 2005) – Experience good only for 1st round

Level-k Reasoning

- Theory for Initial Response (BGT, Ch. 5)
  vs. Theory for Equilibration (BGT, Ch. 6)
- First: Stahl and Wilson (GEB 1995)
- Better: Costa-Gomes, Crawford & Broseta (Econometrica 2001)
- Best 1: Camerer, Ho and Chong (QJE 2004)
  - Poisson Cognitive Hierarchy
- Best 2: Costa-Gomes & Crawford (AER 2006)

Level-k Theory: Stahl & Wilson (GEB 1995)

- Stahl and Wilson (GEB 1995)
- Level-0: Random play
- Level-1: BR to Random play
- Level-2: BR to Level-1
- Nash: Play Nash Equilibrium
- Worldly: BR to distribution of Level-0, Level-1 and Nash types

Level-k Theory: Stahl & Wilson (GEB 1995)

- See "Table IV Parameter Estimates and Confidence Intervals for Mixture Model"

In D.Stahl & Paul Wilson, "On Player's Models of Other Players: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Vol.10, (1995), 218-224.

Level-k Theory: CGCB (ECMA 2001)

- Costa-Gomes, Crawford & Broseta (2001)
- 18 2-player NF games designed to separate:
- Naive (L1), Altruistic (max sum)
- Optimistic (maximax), Pessimistic (maximin)
- L2 (BR to L1)
- D1/D2 (1/2 round of DS deletion)
- Sophisticated (BR to empirical)
- Equilibrium (play Nash)

Level-k Theory: CGCB (ECMA 2001)

- Three treatments (all no feedback):
- Baseline (B)
  - Mouse click to open payoff boxes
- Open Box (OB)
  - Payoff boxes always open
- Training (TS)
  - Rewarded to choose equilibrium strategies

Level-k Theory: CGCB (Econometrica 2001)

- Results 1: Consistency of Strategies with Iterated Dominance
- B, OB: 90%, 65%, 15% equilibrium play
  - For Equilibria requiring 1, 2, 3 levels of ID
- TS: 90-100% equilibrium play
  - For all levels
- Game-theoretic reasoning is not computationally difficult, but unnatural.

Result 2: Estimate Subject Decision Rule

Rule	E(u)	Choice (%)	Choice+Lookup (%)
Altruistic	17.11	8.9	2.2
Pessimistic	20.93	0	4.5
Naïve	21.38	22.7	44.8
Optimistic	21.38	0	2.2
L2	24.87	44.2	44.1
D1	24.13	19.5	0
D2	23.95	0	0
Equilibrium	24.19	5.2	0
Sophisticated	24.93	0	2.2

Result 3: Information Search Patterns

Subject / Rule	↕ own payoff		↔ other payoff	
	Predicted	Actual	Predicted	Actual
TS (Equil.)	>31	63.3	>31	69.3
Equilibrium	>31	21.5	>31	79.0
Naive/Opt.	<31	21.1	-	48.3
Altruistic	<31	21.1	-	60.0
L2	>31	39.4	=31	30.3
D1	>31	28.3	>31	61.7

Level-k Theory: CGCB (ECMA 2001)

- Result 3: Information Search Patterns
- Occurrence (weak requirement)
  - All necessary lookups exist somewhere
- Adjacency (strong requirement)
  - Payoffs compared by rule occur next to each other
- H-M-L: % of Adjacency | 100% occurrence

Result 3: Information Search Patterns

- See "Table V Aggregate Rates of Compliance" in Costa-Gomes, et.al, "Cognition and Behavior in Normal Form Games: An Experimental Study,"Econometrica, Vol.69, No.5, (2001), pp.1231.

Level-k Theory: Cognitive Hierarchy

- Camerer, Ho and Chong (QJE 2004)
- Poisson distribution of level-k thinkers $f(k|\tau)$
  - τ = mean number of thinking steps
- Level-0: choose randomly or use heuristics
- Level-*k* thinkers use *k* steps of thinking BR to a mixture of lower-step thinkers
  - Belief about others is Truncated Poisson
- Easy to compute; Explains many data

Level-k Theory: CGC (AER 2006)

- Costa-Gomes & Crawford (2006)
- 2-Person Guessing Games (*p*-beauty contest)
  - Player 1's guesses 300-500, target = 0.7
  - Player 2's guesses 100-900, target = 1.5
  - $0.7 \times 1.5 = 1.05 > 1 \cdots$
- Unique Equilibrium @ upper bound (500, 750)
- In general:
- Target1 x Target2 > 1: Nash @ upper bounds
- Target1 x Target2 < 1: Nash @ lower bounds

Level-k Theory: CGC (AER 2006)

- 16 Different Games
- Limits:
- α = [100, 500], β = [100, 900],
- γ = [300, 500], δ = [300, 900]
- Target: 1 = 0.5, 2 = 0.7, 3 = 1.3, 4 = 1.5

- No feedback – Elicit Initial Responses

Level-k Theory: CGC (AER 2006)

- Define Various Types:
- Equilibrium (EQ): BR to Nash (play Nash)
- Defining L0 as uniformly random
  - Based on evidence from past normal-form games
- Level-k types L1, L2, and L3:
- L1: BR to L0
- L2: BR to L1
- L3: BR to L2

Level-k Theory: CGC (AER 2006)

- Dominance types:
  - D1: Does one round of dominance and BR to a uniform prior over partner's remaining decisions
  - D2: Does two rounds and BR to a uniform prior
- Sophisticated (SOPH): BR to empirical distribution of others' decisions
  - Ideal type (if all SOPH, coincide with Equilibrium)
  - See if anyone has a *transcended* understanding of others' decisions

Level-k Theory: CGC (AER 2006)

Game	L1	L2	L3	D1	D2	EQ	SOPH
14. β4γ2	600	525	630	600	611.25	750	630
6. δ3γ4	520	650	650	617.5	650	650	650
7. δ3δ3	780	900	900	838.5	900	900	900
11. δ2β3	350	546	318.5	451.5	423.15	300	420
16. α4α2	450	315	472.5	337.5	341.25	500	375
1. α2β1	350	105	122.5	122.5	122.5	100	122
15. α2α4	210	315	220.5	227.5	227.5	350	262
13. γ2β4	350	420	367.5	420	420	500	420
5. γ4δ3	500	500	500	500	500	500	500
4. γ2β1	350	300	300	300	300	300	300
10. α4β1	500	225	375	262.5	262.5	150	300
8. δ3δ3	780	900	900	838.5	900	900	900
12. β3δ2	780	455	709.8	604.5	604.5	390	695
3. β1γ2	200	175	150	200	150	150	162
2. β1α2	150	175	100	150	100	100	132
9. β1α4	150	250	112.5	162.5	131.25	100	187

Level-k Theory: CGC (AER 2006)

- 43 (out of 88) subjects in the baseline made exact guesses (+/- 0.5) in 7 or more games
- Distribution: (L1, L2, L3, EQ) = (20, 12, 3, 8)

TABLE 1—SUMMARY OF BASELINE AND OB SUBJECTS' ESTIMATED TYPE DISTRIBUTIONS

Type	Apparent from guesses	Econometric from guesses	Econometric from guesses, excluding random	Econometric from guesses, with specification test	Econometric from guesses and search, with specification test
L1	20	43	37	27	29
L2	12	20	20	17	14
L3	3	3	3	1	1
D1	0	5	3	1	0
D2	0	0	0	0	0
Eq.	8	14	13	11	10
Soph.	0	3	2	1	1
Unclassified	45	0	10	30	33

Note: The far-right-hand column includes 17 OB subjects classified by their econometric-from-guesses type estimates.

Level-k Theory: CGC (AER 2006)

- No Dk types
- No SOPH types
- No L0 (only in the minds of L1…)
- Deviation from Equilibrium is *cognitive*
- Cannot distinguish/falsify Cognitive Hierarchy
  - BR against lower types, not just L(k-1)
- But distribution is not Poisson (against CH)
  - Is the Poisson assumption crucial?

Level-k Theory: CGC (AER 2006)

- Pseudotypes: Constructed with subjects' guesses in the 16 games (Pseudo-1~Pseudo-88)
- Specification Test: Compare the likelihood of subject's type with likelihoods of pseudotypes
  - Should beat at least 87/8 = 11 pseudotypes
  - Unclassified if failed
- Omitted Type Test: Find clusters that
  - (a) Look like each other, but (b) not like others
  - Pseudotype likelihoods high within, low outside

Level-k Theory: CGC (AER 2006)

- 5 small clusters; total = 11 of 88 subjects
- Other clusters?
  - Could find more smaller clusters in a larger sample, but size smaller than 2/88 (approx. 2%)
- Smaller clusters could be treated as errors
  - No point to build one model per subject…
  - A model for only 2% of population is not general enough to make it worth the trouble

Level-k Theory: CGC (AER 2006)

- Level-k model explains a large fraction of subjects' deviations from equilibrium
  - (that can be explained by a model)
- Although the model explains only half+ of subjects' deviations from equilibrium,
- it may still be optimal for a modeler to treat the rest of the deviations as errors
  - Since the rest is not worth modeling…

How Level-k Model Explains Hide-and-Seek Games?

- Aggregate RTH Hide-and-Seek Game Results:
- Both Hiders and Seekers over-choose central A
- Seekers choose central A even more than hiders

	A	B	A	A
Hiders (624)	0.2163	0.2115	**0.3654**	0.2067
Seekers (560)	0.1821	0.2054	**0.4589**	0.1536

Hide-and-Seek Games: Crawford & Ireberri (2007)

- Can a strategic theory explain this?
- Level-k: Each role is filled by Lk types: $L0$, $L1$, $L2$, $L3$, or $L4$ (probabilities to be estimated)
  - Note: In Hide and Seek the types cycle after $L4$…
- High types anchor beliefs in a naive $L0$ type and adjusts with iterated best responses:
  - $L1$ best responds to $L0$ (with uniform errors)
  - $L2$ best responds to $L1$ (with uniform errors)
  - Lk best responds to Lk-1 (with uniform errors)

Hide-and-Seek Games: Anchoring Type Level-0

- *L*0 Hiders and Seekers are symmetric
  - Favor salient locations equally

1. Favor B: choose with probability $q > 1/4$
2. Favor end A: choose with prob. $p/2 > 1/4$
   - Choice probabilities: $(p/2, q, 1 - p - q, p/2)$

- Note: Specification of Anchoring Type *L*0 is the key to model's explanatory power
  - See Crawford and Ireberri (AER 2007) for other *L*0
  - Cannot use uniform *L*0 (coincide with equilibrium)…

Hide-and-Seek Games: Crawford & Ireberri (2007)

- More (or less) attracted to B: $p/2<q$ ($p/2>q$)
- L1 Hiders choose central A

TABLE 2—TYPES' EXPECTED PAYOFFS AND CHOICE PROBABILITIES IN RTH'S GAMES WHEN $p > 1/2$ AND $q > 1/4$

Hider	Expected payoff (More B)	Choice probability (More B)	Expected payoff (Less B)	Choice probability (Less B)
L0 (Pr. r)				
A	—	$p/2$	—	$p/2$
B	—	q	—	q
A	—	$1-p-q$	—	$1-p-q$
A	—	$p/2$	—	$p/2$
L1 (Pr. s)				
A	$1-p/2 < 3/4$	0	$1-p/2 < 3/4$	0
B	$1-q < 3/4$	0	$1-q < 3/4$	0
A	$p+q > 3/4$	1	$p+q > 3/4$	1
A	$1-p/2 < 3/4$	0	$1-p/2 < 3/4$	0
L2 (Pr. t)				
A	1	1/3	1/2	0
B	0	0	1	1/2
A	1	1/3	1	1/2
A	1	1/3	1/2	0
L3 (Pr. u)				
A	1	1/3	1	1/3
B	1	1/3	1	1/3
A	0	0	0	0
A	1	1/3	1	1/3
L4 (Pr. v)				
A	2/3	0	1	1/2
B	1	1	1/2	0
A	2/3	0	1/2	0
A	2/3	0	1	1/2

Seeker	Expected payoff (More B)	Choice probability (More B)	Expected payoff (Less B)	Choice probability (Less B)
L0 (Pr. r)				
A	—	$p/2$	—	$p/2$
B	—	q	—	q
A	—	$1-p-q$	—	$1-p-q$
A	—	$p/2$	—	$p/2$
L1 (Pr. s)				
A	$p/2 > 1/4$	0	$p/2 > 1/4$	1/2
B	$q > 1/4$	1	$q > 1/4$	0
A	$1-p-q < 1/4$	0	$1-p-q < 1/4$	0
A	$p/2 > 1/4$	0	$p/2 > 1/4$	1/2
L2 (Pr. t)				
A	0	0	0	0
B	0	0	0	0
A	1	1	1	1
A	0	0	0	0
L3 (Pr. u)				
A	1/3	1/3	0	0
B	0	0	1/2	1/2
A	1/3	1/3	1/2	1/2
A	1/3	1/3	0	0
L4 (Pr. v)				
A	1/3	1/3	1/3	1/3
B	1/3	1/3	1/3	1/3
A	0	0	0	0
A	1/3	1/3	1/3	1/3

Hide-and-Seek Games: Crawford & Ireberri (2007)

- More (or less) attracted to B: $p/2<q$ ($p/2>q$)
- L1 Hiders choose central A

TABLE 2—TYPES' EXPECTED PAYOFFS AND CHOICE PROBABILITIES IN RTH'S GAMES WHEN $p > 1/2$ AND $q > 1/4$

Hider	Expected payoff (More B)	Choice probability (More B)	Expected payoff (Less B)	Choice probability (Less B)
L0 (Pr. r)				
A	–	$p/2$	–	$p/2$
B	–	q	–	q
A	–	$1-p-q$	–	$1-p-q$
A	–	$p/2$	–	$p/2$
L1 (Pr. s)				
A	$1-p/2 < 3/4$	0	$1-p/2 < 3/4$	0
B	$1-q < 3/4$	0	$1-q < 3/4$	0
A	$p+q > 3/4$	1	$p+q > 3/4$	1
A	$1-p/2 < 3/4$	0	$1-p/2 < 3/4$	0
L2 (Pr. t)				
A	1	1/3	1/2	0
B	0	0	1	1/2

Seeker	Expected payoff (More B)	Choice probability (More B)	Expected payoff (Less B)	Choice probability (Less B)
L0 (Pr. r)				
A	–	$p/2$	–	$p/2$
B	–	q	–	q
A	–	$1-p-q$	–	$1-p-q$
A	–	$p/2$	–	$p/2$
L1 (Pr. s)				
A	$p/2 > 1/4$	0	$p/2 > 1/4$	1/2
B	$q > 1/4$	1	$q > 1/4$	0
A	$1-p-q < 1/4$	0	$1-p-q < 1/4$	0
A	$p/2 > 1/4$	0	$p/2 > 1/4$	1/2
L2 (Pr. t)				
A	0	0	0	0
B	0	0	0	0

Hide-and-Seek Games: Crawford & Ireberri (2007)

  - More (or less) attracted to B: $p/2<q$ ($p/2>q$)
- L2 Hiders choose central A with prob. in [0,1]

TABLE 2—TYPES' EXPECTED PAYOFFS AND CHOICE PROBABILITIES IN RTH'S GAMES WHEN $p > 1/2$ AND $q > 1/4$

Hider	Expected payoff	Choice probability	Expected payoff	Choice probability	Seeker	Expected payoff	Choice probability	Expected payoff	Choice probability
	More B		Less B			More B		Less B	
L0 (Pr. r)					*L0* (Pr. r)				
A	–	$p/2$	–	$p/2$	A	–	$p/2$	–	$p/2$
B	–	q	–	q	B	–	q	–	q
A	–	$1-p-q$	–	$1-p-q$	A	–	$1-p-q$	–	$1-p-q$
A	–	$p/2$	–	$p/2$	A	–	$p/2$	–	$p/2$
L1 (Pr. s)					*L1* (Pr. s)				
A	$1-p/2<3/4$	0	$1-p/2<3/4$	0	A	$p/2>1/4$	0	$p/2>1/4$	1/2
B	$1-q<3/4$	0	$1-q<3/4$	0	B	$q>1/4$	1	$q>1/4$	0
A	$p+q>3/4$	1	$p+q>3/4$	1	A	$1-p-q<1/4$	0	$1-p-q<1/4$	0
A	$1-p/2<3/4$	0	$1-p/2<3/4$	0	A	$p/2>1/4$	0	$p/2>1/4$	1/2
L2 (Pr. t)					*L2* (Pr. t)				
A	1	1/3	1/2	0	A	0	0	0	0
B	0	0	1	1/2	B	0	0	0	0
A	1	1/3	1	1/2	A	1	1	1	1
A	1	1/3	1/2	0	A	0	0	0	0
L3 (Pr. u)					*L3* (Pr. u)				
A	1	1/3	1	1/3	A	1/3	1/3	0	0
B	1	1/3	1	1/3	B	0	0	1/2	1/2
A	0	0	0	0	A	1/3	1/3	1/2	1/2
A	1	1/3	1	1/3	A	1/3	1/3	0	0
L4 (Pr. v)					*L4* (Pr. v)				
A	2/3	0	1	1/2	A	1/3	1/3	1/3	1/3
B	1	1	1/2	0	B	1/3	1/3	1/3	1/3
A	2/3	0	1/2	0	A	0	0	0	0
A	2/3	0	1	1/2	A	1/3	1/3	1/3	1/3

Hide-and-Seek Games: Crawford & Ireberri (2007)

  - More (or less) attracted to B: $p/2<q$ ($p/2>q$)
- L2 Seekers choose central A for sure

TABLE 2—TYPES' EXPECTED PAYOFFS AND CHOICE PROBABILITIES IN RTH'S GAMES WHEN $p > 1/2$ AND $q > 1/4$

Hider	Expected payoff	Choice probability	Expected payoff	Choice probability	Seeker	Expected payoff	Choice probability	Expected payoff	Choice probability
	More B		Less B			More B		Less B	
L0 (Pr. *r*)					*L0* (Pr. *r*)				
A	–	$p/2$	–	$p/2$	A	–	$p/2$	–	$p/2$
B	–	q	–	q	B	–	q	–	q
A	–	$1-p-q$	–	$1-p-q$	A	–	$1-p-q$	–	$1-p-q$
A	–	$p/2$	–	$p/2$	A	–	$p/2$	–	$p/2$
L1 (Pr. *s*)					*L1* (Pr. *s*)				
A	$1-p/2<3/4$	0	$1-p/2<3/4$	0	A	$p/2>1/4$	0	$p/2>1/4$	1/2
B	$1-q<3/4$	0	$1-q<3/4$	0	B	$q>1/4$	1	$q>1/4$	0
A	$p+q>3/4$	1	$p+q>3/4$	1	A	$1-p-q<1/4$	0	$1-p-q<1/4$	0
A	$1-p/2<3/4$	0	$1-p/2<3/4$	0	A	$p/2>1/4$	0	$p/2>1/4$	1/2
L2 (Pr. *t*)					*L2* (Pr. *t*)				
A	1	1/3	1/2	0	A	0	0	0	0
B	0	0	1	1/2	B	0	0	0	0
A	1	1/3	1	1/2	A	1	1	1	1
A	1	1/3	1/2	0	A	0	0	0	0
L3 (Pr. *u*)					*L3* (Pr. *u*)				
A	1	1/3	1	1/3	A	1/3	1/3	0	0
B	1	1/3	1	1/3	B	0	0	1/2	1/2
A	0	0	0	0	A	1/3	1/3	1/2	1/2
A	1	1/3	1	1/3	A	1/3	1/3	0	0
L4 (Pr. *v*)					*L4* (Pr. *v*)				
A	2/3	0	1	1/2	A	1/3	1/3	1/3	1/3
B	1	1	1/2	0	B	1/3	1/3	1/3	1/3
A	2/3	0	1/2	0	A	0	0	0	0
A	2/3	0	1	1/2	A	1/3	1/3	1/3	1/3

TABLE 2—TYPES' EXPECTED PAYOFFS AND CHOICE PROBABILITIES IN RTH'S GAMES WHEN $p > 1/2$ AND $q > 1/4$

Hider	More B: Expected payoff	More B: Choice probability	Less B: Expected payoff	Less B: Choice probability
L0 (Pr. r)				
A	–	$p/2$	–	$p/2$
B	–	q	–	q
A	–	$1-p-q$	–	$1-p-q$
A	–	$p/2$	–	$p/2$
L1 (Pr. s)				
A	$1-p/2 < 3/4$	0	$1-p/2 < 3/4$	0
B	$1-q < 3/4$	0	$1-q < 3/4$	0
A	$p+q > 3/4$	1	$p+q > 3/4$	1
A	$1-p/2 < 3/4$	0	$1-p/2 < 3/4$	0
L2 (Pr. t)				
A	1	1/3	1/2	0
B	0	0	1	1/2
A	1	1/3	1	1/2
A	1	1/3	1/2	0
L3 (Pr. u)				
A	1	1/3	1	1/3
B	1	1/3	1	1/3
A	0	0	0	0
A	1	1/3	1	1/3
L4 (Pr. v)				
A	2/3	0	1	1/2
B	1	1	1/2	0
A	2/3	0	1/2	0
A	2/3	0	1	1/2

Seeker	More B: Expected payoff	More B: Choice probability	Less B: Expected payoff	Less B: Choice probability
L0 (Pr. r)				
A	–	$p/2$	–	$p/2$
B	–	q	–	q
A	–	$1-p-q$	–	$1-p-q$
A	–	$p/2$	–	$p/2$
L1 (Pr. s)				
A	$p/2 > 1/4$	0	$p/2 > 1/4$	1/2
B	$q > 1/4$	1	$q > 1/4$	0
A	$1-p-q < 1/4$	0	$1-p-q < 1/4$	0
A	$p/2 > 1/4$	0	$p/2 > 1/4$	1/2
L2 (Pr. t)				
A	0	0	0	0
B	0	0	0	0
A	1	1	1	1
A	0	0	0	0
L3 (Pr. u)				
A	1/3	1/3	0	0
B	0	0	1/2	1/2
A	1/3	1/3	1/2	1/2
A	1/3	1/3	0	0
L4 (Pr. v)				
A	1/3	1/3	1/3	1/3
B	1/3	1/3	1/3	1/3
A	0	0	0	0
A	1/3	1/3	1/3	1/3

TABLE 2—TYPES' EXPECTED PAYOFFS AND CHOICE PROBABILITIES IN RTH'S GAMES WHEN $p > 1/2$ AND $q > 1/4$

Hider	More B: Expected payoff	More B: Choice probability	Less B: Expected payoff	Less B: Choice probability	Seeker	More B: Expected payoff	More B: Choice probability	Less B: Expected payoff	Less B: Choice probability
L0 (Pr. r)					*L0* (Pr. r)				
A	–	$p/2$	–	$p/2$	A	–	$p/2$	–	$p/2$
B	–	q	–	q	B	–	q	–	q
A	–	$1-p-q$	–	$1-p-q$	A	–	$1-p-q$	–	$1-p-q$
A	–	$p/2$	–	$p/2$	A	–	$p/2$	–	$p/2$
L1 (Pr. s)					*L1* (Pr. s)				
A	$1-p/2 < 3/4$	0	$1-p/2 < 3/4$	0	A	$p/2 > 1/4$	0	$p/2 > 1/4$	1/2
B	$1-q < 3/4$	0	$1-q < 3/4$	0	B	$q > 1/4$	1	$q > 1/4$	0
A	$p+q > 3/4$	1	$p+q > 3/4$	1	A	$1-p-q < 1/4$	0	$1-p-q < 1/4$	0
A	$1-p/2 < 3/4$	0	$1-p/2 < 3/4$	0	A	$p/2 > 1/4$	0	$p/2 > 1/4$	1/2
L2 (Pr. t)					*L2* (Pr. t)				
A	1	1/3	1/2	0	A	0	0	0	0
B	0	0	1	1/2	B	0	0	0	0
A	1	1/3	1	1/2	A	1	1	1	1
A	1	1/3	1/2	0	A	0	0	0	0
L3 (Pr. u)					*L3* (Pr. u)				
A	1	1/3	1	1/3	A	1/3	1/3	0	0
B	1	1/3	1	1/3	B	0	0	1/2	1/2
A	0	0	0	0	A	1/3	1/3	1/2	1/2
A	1	1/3	1	1/3	A	1/3	1/3	0	0
L4 (Pr. v)					*L4* (Pr. v)				
A	2/3	0	1	1/2	A	1/3	1/3	1/3	1/3
B	1	1	1/2	0	B	1/3	1/3	1/3	1/3
A	2/3	0	1/2	0	A	0	0	0	0
A	2/3	0	1	1/2	A	1/3	1/3	1/3	1/3

Table 2—Types' Expected Payoffs and Choice Probabilities in RTH's Games when $p > 1/2$ and $q > 1/4$

Hider	Expected payoff	Choice probability	Expected payoff	Choice probability
	More B		Less B	
L0 (Pr. r)				
A	–	$p/2$	–	$p/2$
B	–	q	–	q
A	–	$1-p-q$	–	$1-p-q$
A	–	$p/2$	–	$p/2$
L1 (Pr. s)				
A	$1-p/2 < 3/4$	0	$1-p/2 < 3/4$	0
B	$1-q < 3/4$	0	$1-q < 3/4$	0
A	$p+q > 3/4$	1	$p+q > 3/4$	1
A	$1-p/2 < 3/4$	0	$1-p/2 < 3/4$	0
L2 (Pr. t)				
A	1	1/3	1/2	0
B	0	0	1	1/2
A	1	1/3	1	1/2
A	1	1/3	1/2	0
L3 (Pr. u)				
A	1	1/3	1	1/3
B	1	1/3	1	1/3
A	0	0	0	0
A	1	1/3	1	1/3
L4 (Pr. v)				
A	2/3	0	1	1/2
B	1	1	1/2	0
A	2/3	0	1/2	0
A	2/3	0	1	1/2

Seeker	Expected payoff	Choice probability	Expected payoff	Choice probability
	More B		Less B	
L0 (Pr. r)				
A	–	$p/2$	–	$p/2$
B	–	q	–	q
A	–	$1-p-q$	–	$1-p-q$
A	–	$p/2$	–	$p/2$
L1 (Pr. s)				
A	$p/2 > 1/4$	0	$p/2 > 1/4$	1/2
B	$q > 1/4$	1	$q > 1/4$	0
A	$1-p-q < 1/4$	0	$1-p-q < 1/4$	0
A	$p/2 > 1/4$	0	$p/2 > 1/4$	1/2
L2 (Pr. t)				
A	0	0	0	0
B	0	0	0	0
A	1	1	1	1
A	0	0	0	0
L3 (Pr. u)				
A	1/3	1/3	0	0
B	0	0	1/2	1/2
A	1/3	1/3	1/2	1/2
A	1/3	1/3	0	0
L4 (Pr. v)				
A	1/3	1/3	1/3	1/3
B	1/3	1/3	1/3	1/3
A	0	0	0	0
A	1/3	1/3	1/3	1/3

TABLE 2—TYPES' EXPECTED PAYOFFS AND CHOICE PROBABILITIES IN RTH'S GAMES WHEN $p > 1/2$ AND $q > 1/4$

Hider	Expected payoff $p < 2q$	Choice probability $p < 2q$	Expected payoff $p > 2q$	Choice probability $p > 2q$
L0 (Pr. r)				
A	More B		Less B	/2
B	–	q	–	q
A	–	$1-p-q$	–	$1-p-q$
A	–	$p/2$	–	$p/2$
L1 (Pr. s)				
A	$1 - p/2 < 3/4$	0	$1 - p/2 < 3/4$	0
B	$1 - q < 3/4$	0	$1 - q < 3/4$	0
A	$p + q > 3/4$	1	$p + q > 3/4$	1
A	$1 - p/2 < 3/4$	0	$1 - p/2 < 3/4$	0
L2 (Pr. t)				
A	1	1/3	1/2	0
B	0	0	1	1/2
A	1	1/3	1	1/2
A	1	1/3	1/2	0
L3 (Pr. u)				
A	1	1/3	1	1/3
B	1	1/3	1	1/3
A	0	0	0	0
A	1	1/3	1	1/3
L4 (Pr. v)				
A	2/3	0	1	1/2
B	1	1	1/2	0
A	2/3	0	1/2	0
A	2/3	0	1	1/2

Seeker	Expected payoff $p < 2q$	Choice probability $p < 2q$	Expected payoff $p > 2q$	Choice probability $p > 2q$
L0 (Pr				
A	More B	$p/2$	Less B	$p/2$
B	–	q	–	q
A	–	$1-p-q$	–	$1-p-q$
A	–	$p/2$	–	$p/2$
L1 (Pr. s)				
A	$p/2 > 1/4$	0	$p/2 > 1/4$	1/2
B	$q > 1/4$	1	$q > 1/4$	0
A	$1-p-q < 1/4$	0	$1-p-q < 1/4$	0
A	$p/2 > 1/4$	0	$p/2 > 1/4$	1/2
L2 (Pr. t)				
A	0	0	0	0
B	0	0	0	0
A	1	1	1	1
A	0	0	0	0
L3 (Pr. u)				
A	1/3	1/3	0	0
B	0	0	1/2	1/2
A	1/3	1/3	1/2	1/2
A	1/3	1/3	0	0
L4 (Pr. v)				
A	1/3	1/3	1/3	1/3
B	1/3	1/3	1/3	1/3
A	0	0	0	0
A	1/3	1/3	1/3	1/3

Hide-and-Seek Games: Explain Stylized Facts

- Given *L0* playing (p/2, q, 1 - p - q, p/2),
  - *L1* Hiders choose central A (avoid *L0* Seekers)
  - *L1* Seekers avoid central A (search for *L0* Hiders)
- *L2* Hiders choose central A with prob. in [0,1]
- *L2* Seekers choose central A for sure

- *L3* Hiders avoid central A
- *L3* Seekers choose central A w/ prob. in [0,1]

- *L4* Hiders and Seekers both avoid central A

Hide-and-Seek Games: Explain Stylized Facts

- Heterogeneous Population (L0, L1, L2, L3, L4) = (r, s, t, u, v) with r=0, t, u large and s *not too large* can reproduce the stylized facts
- Need $s<(2t+u)/3$ (More B) or $s<(t+u)/2$ (Less B)
- estimated r = 0, s=19%, t=32%, u=24%, v=25%

Total	$p < 2q$	$p > 2q$
A	$rp/2+(1-\varepsilon)[t/3+u/3]+(1-r)\varepsilon/4$	$rp/2+(1-\varepsilon)[u/3+v/2]+(1-r)\varepsilon/4$
B	$rq+(1-\varepsilon)[u/3+v]+(1-r)\varepsilon/4$	$rq+(1-\varepsilon)[t/2+u/3]+(1-r)\varepsilon/4$
A	$r(1-p-q)+(1-\varepsilon)[s+t/3]+(1-r)\varepsilon/4$	$r(1-p-q)+(1-\varepsilon)[s+t/2]+(1-r)\varepsilon/4$
A	$rp/2+(1-\varepsilon)[t/3+u/3]+(1-r)\varepsilon/4$	$rp/2+(1-\varepsilon)[u/3+v/2]+(1-r)\varepsilon/4$

Total	$p < 2q$	$p > 2q$
A	$rp/2+(1-\varepsilon)[u/3+v/3]+(1-r)\varepsilon/4$	$rp/2+(1-\varepsilon)[s/2+v/3]+(1-r)\varepsilon/4$
B	$rq+(1-\varepsilon)[s+v/3]+(1-r)\varepsilon/4$	$rq+(1-\varepsilon)[u/2+v/3]+(1-r)\varepsilon/4$
A	$r(1-p-q)+(1-\varepsilon)[t+u/3]+(1-r)\varepsilon/4$	$r(1-p-q)+(1-\varepsilon)[t+u/2]+(1-r)\varepsilon/4$
A	$rp/2+(1-\varepsilon)[u/3+v/3]+(1-r)\varepsilon/4$	$rp/2+(1-\varepsilon)[s/2+v/3]+(1-r)\varepsilon/4$

Hide-and-Seek Games: Out of Sample Prediction

- Estimate on one treatment and predict other five treatments
  - 30 Comparisons: 6 estimations, each predict 5
- This Level-k Model with symmetric $L0$ beats other models (LQRE, Nash + noise)
  - Mean Squared prediction Error (MSE) 18% lower
  - Better predictions in 20 of 30 comparisons

HS Level-k Model Ported to Joker Game

- Can Level-k Reasoning developed from the Hide-and-Seek Game predict results of other games?
  – Try O'Neil (1987)'s Joker Game

- Stylized Facts:
  – Aggregate Frequencies close MSE
  – Ace Effect (A chosen more often than 2 or 3);
    - Not captured by QRE

The Joker Game: O'Neill (1987)

	A	2	3	J	MSE	Actual	QRE
A	-5	5	5	-5	0.2	0.221	0.213
2	5	-5	5	-5	0.2	0.215	0.213
3	5	5	-5	-5	0.2	0.203	0.213
J	-5	-5	-5	5	0.4	0.362	0.360
MSE	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.4			
Actual	0.226	0.179	0.169	0.426			
QRE	0.191	0.191	0.191	0.427			

- Actual frequencies are quite close to MSE
- QRE better, but cannot get the Ace effect

HS Level-k Model Ported to Joker Game

- Level-*k* model w/ symmetric *L0* (favor A&J)
- *L0*: $(a, (1-a-j)/2, (1-a-j)/2, j)$, $a, j > 1/4$
  - A and J, 'face' cards and end locations, are more salient than 2 and 3..
- Higher *Lk* type BR to *L(k-1)* (Table A3-A4)
- Challenge: To get the Ace Effect (without L0), need a population of almost all L4 or L3
  - This is an empirical question, but very unlikely

HS Level-k Model Ported to Joker Game

- Could there be no Ace Effect in the initial rounds of O'Neil's data?
  - The Level-k model predicts a Joker Effect instead!

- Crawford and Ireberri asked for O'Neil's data
  - And they found…
- Initial Choice Frequencies
  - (A, 2, 3, J) = (8%, 24%, 12%, 56%) for Player 1
  - (A, 2, 3, J) = (16%, 12%, 8%, 64%) for Player 2

Table 5. Comparison of the Leading Models in O'Neill's Game

Model	Parameter estimates	Observed or predicted choice frequencies					MSE
		Player	A	2	3	J	
Observed frequencies		1	0.0800	0.2400	0.1200	0.5600	-
(25 Player 1s, 25 Player 2s)		2	0.1600	0.1200	0.0800	0.6400	-
Equilibrium without perturbations		1	0.2000	0.2000	0.2000	0.4000	0.0120
		2	0.2000	0.2000	0.2000	0.4000	0.0200
Level-*k* with a role-symmetric	$a > 1/4$ and $j > 1/4$	1	0.0824	0.1772	0.1772	0.5631	0.0018
L0 that favors salience	$3j - a < 1,\ a + 2j < 1$	2	0.1640	0.1640	0.1640	0.5081	0.0066
Level-*k* with a role-symmetric	$a > 1/4$ and $j > 1/4$	1	0.0000	0.2541	0.2541	0.4919	0.0073
L0 that favors salience	$3j - a < 1,\ a + 2j > 1$	2	0.2720	0.0824	0.0824	0.5631	0.0050
Level-*k* with a role-symmetric	$a < 1/4$ and $j < 1/4$	1	0.4245	0.1807	0.1807	0.2142	0.0614
L0 that avoids salience		2	0.1670	0.1807	0.1807	0.4717	0.0105
Level-*k* with a role-asymmetric *L0* that favors salience for locations for which	$a_1 < 1/4,\ j_1 > 1/4;$ $a_2 > 1/4,\ j_2 < 1/4$	1	0.1804	0.2729	0.2729	0.2739	0.0291
player is a seeker and avoids it for locations for which player is a hider	$3j_1 - a_1 < 1,\ a_1 + 2j_1 < 1,$ $3a_2 + j_2 > 1$	2	0.1804	0.1804	0.1804	0.4589	0.0117

Conclusion

- Limit of Strategic Thinking: 2-3 steps
- Theory (for initial responses)
- Level-k Types:
  - Stahl-Wilson (GEB 1995), CGCB (ECMA 2001)
  - Costa-Gomes and Crawford (AER 2006)
  - Chen, Huang and Wang (mimeo 2013)
- Cognitive Hierarchy:
  - CHC (QJE 2004)

Applications

- p-Beauty Contest:
  - Costa-Gomes and Crawford (AER 2006)
  - Chen, Huang and Wang (mimeo 2013)
- MSE:
  - Hide-and-Seek: Crawford and Iriberri (AER 2007)
  - LUPI: Ostling, Wang, Chou and Camerer (AEJ 2011)
- Auctions:
  - Overbidding: Crawford and Iriberri (AER 2007)
  - Repeated eBay Auctions: Wang (2006)

More Applications

- Coordination-Battle of the Sexes (Simple Market Entry Game):
  - Camerer, Ho and Chong (QJE 2004)
  - Crawford (2007)
- Pure Coordination Games:
  - Crawford, Gneezy and Rottenstreich (AER 2008)
- Pre-play Communication:
  - Crawford (AER 2003)
  - Ellingsen and Ostling (AER 2011)

More Applications

- Strategic Information Communication:
  - Crawford (AER 2003)
  - Cai and Wang (GEB 2006)
  - Kawagoe and Takizawa (GEB 2008)
  - Wang, Spezio and Camerer (AER 2010)
  - Brown, Leveno and Camerer (AEJ 2012)
  - Lai, Lim and Wang (GEB 2015)
  - Battaglini, Lai, Lim and Wang (work-in-progress)

致謝

- “Anomalous Behavior in a Traveler‘s Dilemma?,” American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 89(3), pages 678-690, June. （19 頁投影片）
- 感謝以上的教授與期刊願意讓我們使用圖片

致謝

- Nagel, Rosemarie, 1995. “Unraveling in Guessing Games: An Experimental Study,” American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(5), pages 1313-26, December. （第 21 、 22 張投影片）
- Ho, Teck-Hua & Camerer, Colin & Weigelt, Keith, 1998.“Iterated Dominance and Iterated Best Response in Experimental "p-Beauty Contests.",” American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(4), pages 947-69, September. （ p.26, 27, 29, 31, 34-39 ）

- 感謝以上的教授與期刊願意讓我們使用圖片

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- Vincent P. Crawford & Miguel A. Costa-Gomes, 2006. “Cognition and Behavior in Two-Person Guessing Games: An Experimental Study,” American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(5), pages 1737-1768, December.
  (第59張投影片)
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1-89		CC BY NC SA	國立臺灣大學 經濟學系 王道一 教授
3,4,6	A B A A		A. Rubinstein, A. Tversky, and D.Heller, “Naive Strategies in Competitive Games,” Understanding Strategic Interaction: Essays in honor of Reinhard Selten, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, pp.396. 依據著作權法第 46 、 52 、 65 條合理使用
5	Folk Theory: “…in Lake Wobegon, the correct answer is usually ‘c’.”		Garrison Keillor qtd. In Attali, Yigal, and Maya Bar-Hillel. “GuessWhere: The Position of Correct Answers in Multiple-Choice Test Items as a Psychometric Variable.” Journal of Educational Measurement, No.40, Vol.2,(2003),pp. 109–28. 依據著作權法第 46 、 52 、 65 條合理使用
5	Any government wanting to kill an opponent …would not try it at a mee		Viktor Yushchenko.qtd. in Chivers, C. J. 2004. “A Dinner in Ukraine Made for Agatha Christie.” New York Times, December 20, A1.

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<tr><th>Hider/Seeker</th><th>A</th><th>B</th><th>A</th><th>A</th></tr>
<tr><td>A</td><td>0,1</td><td>1,0</td><td>1,0</td><td>1,0</td></tr>
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</td><td></td><td>A. Rubinstein, A. Tversky, and D.Heller, “Naive Strategies in Competitive Games,” Understanding Strategic Interaction: Essays in honor of Reinhard Selten, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, pp.395-396.
依據著作權法第 46 、 52 、 65 條合理使用</td></tr>
<tr><td>8</td><td>All Treatments in RTH: Baseline: ABAA …hiders = seekers, mine seekers = hiders</td><td></td><td>A. Rubinstein, A. Tversky, and D.Heller, “Naive Strategies in Competitive Games,” Understanding Strategic Interaction: Essays in honor of Reinhard Selten, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, pp.396-401.
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<tr><td>9-10</td><td>
<table>
<tr><td>RTH-4</td><td>A</td><td>B</td><td>A</td><td>A</td></tr>
<tr><td>Hider (53)</td><td>9%</td><td>36%</td><td>40%</td><td>15%</td></tr>
<tr><td>Seeker (62)</td><td>13%</td><td>31%</td><td>45%</td><td>11%</td></tr>
<tr><td>RT-AABA-Treasure</td><td>A</td><td>A</td><td>B</td><td>A</td></tr>
<tr><td>Hider (189)</td><td>22%</td><td>35%</td><td>19%</td><td>25%</td></tr>
<tr><td>Seeker (85)</td><td>13%</td><td>51%</td><td>21%</td><td>15%</td></tr>
<tr><td>RT-AABA-Mine</td><td>A</td><td>A</td><td>B</td><td>A</td></tr>
<tr><td>Hider (132)</td><td>24%</td><td>39%</td><td>18%</td><td>18%</td></tr>
<tr><td>Seeker (73)</td><td>29%</td><td>36%</td><td>14%</td><td>22%</td></tr>
<tr><td>RT-1234-Treasure</td><td>1</td><td>2</td><td>3</td><td>4</td></tr>
<tr><td>Hider (187)</td><td>25%</td><td>22%</td><td>36%</td><td>18%</td></tr>
<tr><td>Seeker (84)</td><td>20%</td><td>18%</td><td>48%</td><td>14%</td></tr>
<tr><td>RT-1234-Mine</td><td>1</td><td>2</td><td>3</td><td>4</td></tr>
<tr><td>Hider (133)</td><td>18%</td><td>20%</td><td>44%</td><td>17%</td></tr>
<tr><td>Seeker (72)</td><td>19%</td><td>25%</td><td>36%</td><td>19%</td></tr>
<tr><td>R-ABAA</td><td>A</td><td>B</td><td>A</td><td>A</td></tr>
<tr><td>Hider (50)</td><td>16%</td><td>18%</td><td>44%</td><td>22%</td></tr>
<tr><td>Seeker (64)</td><td>16%</td><td>19%</td><td>54%</td><td>11%</td></tr>
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<table>
<tr><th></th><th>A</th><th>B</th><th>A</th><th>A</th></tr>
<tr><td>Hiders (624)</td><td>0.2163</td><td>0.2115</td><td>0.3654</td><td>0.2067</td></tr>
<tr><td>Seekers (560)</td><td>0.1821</td><td>0.2054</td><td>0.4589</td><td>0.1536</td></tr>
</table>
</td><td></td><td>Vincent P. Crawford and Nagore Iriberri,”Fatal Attraction: Salience, Naïveté, and Sophistication in Experimental “Hide-and-Seek” Games,” American Economic Review, Vol.97,No.5, (2007,) pp.1735
依據著作權法第 46 、 52 、 65 條合理使用</td></tr>
<tr><td>11&64</td><td></td><td></td><td>Vincent P. Crawford and Nagore Iriberri,”Fatal Attraction: Salience, Naïveté, and Sophistication in Experimental “Hide-and-Seek” Games,” American Economic Review</td></tr>
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12	The finding that both choosers and guessers selected the least salient alternative suggests little or no strategic thinking		A. Rubinstein, A. Tversky, and D.Heller, “Naive Strategies in Competitive Games,” Understanding Strategic Interaction: Essays in honor of Reinhard Selten, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, pp.401. 依據著作權法第 46 、 52 、 65 條合理使用
15	Two firms pick prices p_1 & p_2 …α<1: Bertrand competition predicts lowest price		M. Capra. et al, “Learning and Noisy Equilibrium Behavior in an Experimental Study of Imperfect Price Competition,” International Economic Review, Vol.43, No.3, (2002), pp.613-616. 依據著作權法第 46 、 52 、 65 條合理使用
16	Figure 5 Average Price Season		M.Capra. et al, “Learning and Noisy Equilibrium Behavior in an Experimental Study of Imperfect Price Competition,” International Economic Review, Vol.43, No.3, (2002), pp.624. 依據著作權法第 46 、 52 、 65 條合理使用
17	Figure 4 Simulated Average Price		M.Capra. et al, “Learning and Noisy Equilibrium Behavior in an Experimental Study of Imperfect Price Competition,” International Economic Review, Vol.43, No.3, (2002), pp.623. 依據著作權法第 46 、 52 、 65 條合理使用

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頁碼	作品	版權標示	來源 / 作者
18	Two travelers state claim p1 and p2 : 80-200 Airline awards both the minimum claim, but … Unique NE: race to… lowest claim		Capra, C. Monica, Jacob K. Goeree, Rosario Gomez, and Charles A. Holt, “Anomalous Behavior in a Traveler’s Dilemma?” American Economic Review, Vol.89, No.3, (2002), pp. 678-679. 依據著作權法第 46 、 52 、 65 條合理使用
19	 		Capra, C. Monica, Jacob K. Goeree, Rosario Gomez, and Charles A. Holt, “Anomalous Behavior in a Traveler’s Dilemma?” American Economic Review, Vol.89, No.3, (2002), pp. 680 由所有人 C. Monica Capra & Jacob K Goeree & Rosario Gomez & Charles A Holt 授權，您如須利用本作品，請另行向權利人取得授權。
21			Rosemarie Nagel, “Unraveling in Guessing Games: An Experimental Study,” American Economic Review Vol. 85, No. 5 (Dec., 1995), pp. 1316. 由所有人 Rosemarie Nagel 授權，您如須利用本作品，請另行向權利人取得授權。
22			Rosemarie Nagel, “Unraveling in Guessing Games: An Experimental Study,” American Economic Review Vol. 85, No.

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23-25	professional investment may be likened to … And there are some, I believe, who practice the fourth, fifth and higher degrees.”		J.M. Keynes, “The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money, A Project Gutenberg of Australian ebook. (http://gutenberg.net.au/ebooks03/0300071h/printall.html) 瀏覽日期： 2015/12/21
26	Figure 1A. A Finite-Threshold Game, $FT(n) = ([100, 200], 1.3, n)$ Figure 1B. An Infinite-Threshold Game, $IT(n) = ([0, 100], 0.7, n)$		Camerer,Colin et al, “Iterated Dominance and Iterated Best Response in Experimental ”p-Beauty Contests,” American Economic Review, (1995), pp.951. 由所有人 Ho, Teck-Hua & Colin Camerer & Keith Weigelt 授權，您如須利用本作品，請另行向權利人取得授權。
27	Table 1—The Experimental Design Group size: 3 / 7 Finite → Infinite $FT(1.3, 3) \to IT(0.7, 3)$ (7 groups) / $FT(1.3, 7) \to IT(0.7, 7)$ (7 groups) $FT(1.1, 3) \to IT(0.9, 3)$ (7 groups) / $FT(1.1, 7) \to IT(0.9, 7)$ (7 groups) Infinite → Finite $IT(0.7, 3) \to FT(1.3, 3)$ (7 groups) / $IT(0.7, 7) \to FT(1.3, 7)$ (7 groups) $IT(0.9, 3) \to FT(1.1, 3)$ (6 groups) / $IT(0.9, 7) \to FT(1.1, 7)$ (7 groups)		Camerer,Colin et al, “Iterated Dominance and Iterated Best Response in Experimental ”p-Beauty Contests,” American Economic Review, (1995), pp.952. 由所有人 Ho, Teck-Hua & Colin Camerer & Keith Weigelt 授權，您如須利用本作品，請另行向權利人取得授權。
	First-period choice from equilibrium		Camerer,Colin et al, “Iterated Dominance and Iterated Best

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29,31&36			Camerer,Colin et al, “Iterated Dominance and Iterated Best Response in Experimental ”p-Beauty Contests,” American Economic Review, (1995), pp.953 由所有人 Ho, Teck-Hua & Colin Camerer & Keith Weigelt 授權，您如須利用本作品，請另行向權利人取得授權。
29			Camerer,Colin et al, “Iterated Dominance and Iterated Best Response in Experimental ”p-Beauty Contests,” American Economic Review, (1995), pp.953 由所有人 Ho, Teck-Hua & Colin Camerer & Keith Weigelt 授權，您如須利用本作品，請另行向權利人取得授權。
30	On average, choices are closer to the equilibrium point for games with finite thresh… es with p furth…		Camerer,Colin et al, “Iterated Dominance and Iterated Best Response in Experimental "p-Beauty Contests,” American Economic Review, (1995), pp.957. 依據著作權法第 46 、 52 、 65 條合理使用
31			Camerer,Colin et al, “Iterated Dominance and Iterated Best Response in Experimental ”p-Beauty Contests,” American Economic Review, (1995), pp.957. 由所有人 Ho, Teck-Hua

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31	 FIGURE 3B. CHOICES OVER ROUND IN FT GAMES PLAYED BY 7-PERSON GROUPS		Camerer,Colin et al, “Iterated Dominance and Iterated Best Response in Experimental "p-Beauty Contests,” American Economic Review, (1995), pp.958. 由所有人 Ho, Teck-Hua & Colin Camerer & Keith Weigelt 授權，您如須利用本作品，請另行向權利人取得授權。
32	Choices are closer to equilibrium for large (7-person) groups than for small (3-person) groups.		Camerer,Colin et al, “Iterated Dominance and Iterated Best Response in Experimental "p-Beauty Contests,” American Economic Review, (1995), pp.958. 依據著作權法第 46 、 52 、 65 條合理使用
33&38	 FIGURE 2E. INEXPERIENCED SUBJECTS' CHOICES OVER ROUND IN IT(0.7, 3)  FIGURE 2C. INEXPERIENCED SUBJECTS' CHOICES OVER ROUND IN IT(0.9, 7)		Camerer,Colin et al, “Iterated Dominance and Iterated Best Response in Experimental ”p-Beauty Contests,” American Economic Review, (1995), pp.955. 由所有人 Ho, Teck-Hua & Colin Camerer & Keith Weigelt 授權，您如須利用本作品，請另行向權利人取得授權。
			Camerer,Colin et al, “Iterated Dominance and Iterated Best Response in Experimental ”p-Beauty Contests,” American

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34&39			Camerer,Colin et al, “Iterated Dominance and Iterated Best Response in Experimental ”p-Beauty Contests,” American Economic Review, (1995), pp.956. 由所有人 Ho, Teck-Hua & Colin Camerer & Keith Weigelt 授權，您如須利用本作品，請另行向權利人取得授權。
35	Choices by [cross-game] experienced subjects are no different than choices by inexperienced subjects in the first ro... but converge faster to equi...		Camerer,Colin et al, “Iterated Dominance and Iterated Best Response in Experimental "p-Beauty Contests,” American Economic Review, (1995), pp.959. 依據著作權法第 46 、 52 、 65 條合理使用
36	 		Camerer,Colin et al, “Iterated Dominance and Iterated Best Response in Experimental ”p-Beauty Contests,” American Economic Review, (1995), pp.953. 由所有人 Ho, Teck-Hua & Colin Camerer & Keith Weigelt 授權，您如須利用本作品，請另行向權利人取得授權。
			Camerer,Colin et al, “Iterated Dominance and Iterated Best Response in Experimental ”p-Beauty Contests,” American

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38			Camerer,Colin et al, “Iterated Dominance and Iterated Best Response in Experimental ”p-Beauty Contests,” American Economic Review, (1995), pp.955. 由所有人 Ho, Teck-Hua & Colin Camerer & Keith Weigelt 授權，您如須利用本作品，請另行向權利人取得授權。
39			Camerer,Colin et al, “Iterated Dominance and Iterated Best Response in Experimental ”p-Beauty Contests,” American Economic Review, (1995), pp.956. 由所有人 Ho, Teck-Hua & Colin Camerer & Keith Weigelt 授權，您如須利用本作品，請另行向權利人取得授權。
40	Level-0: pick randomly from N(μ, σ)… Level-3: BR to level-2 with nois 		Camerer,Colin et al, “Iterated Dominance and Iterated Best Response in Experimental "p-Beauty Contests,” American Economic Review, (1995), pp.962-963. 依據著作權法第 46 、 52 、 65 條合理使用
41			Camerer,Colin et al, “Iterated Dominance and Iterated Best Response in Experimental "p-Beauty Contests,” American Economic Review, (1995), pp.963

TABLE 3—MAXIMUM-LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATES AND LOG-LIKELIHOODS FOR LEVELS OF ITERATED DOMINANCE (FIRST-ROUND DATA ONLY)

Parameter estimates	Out data (groups of 3 or 7)		Nagel's data (groups of 16–18)	
	$IT(p, n)$	$FT(p, n)$	$IT(0.5, n)$	$IT(2/3, n)$
ω_0	15.93	21.72	45.83 (23.94)	28.36 (13.11)
ω_1	20.74	31.46	37.50 (29.58)	34.33 (44.26)
ω_2	13.53	12.73	16.67 (40.84)	37.31 (39.34)
ω_3	49.50	34.08	0.00 (5.63)	0.00 (3.28)
μ	70.13	100.50	35.53 (50.00)	52.23 (50.00)
σ	28.28	26.89	22.70	14.72
ρ	1.00	1.00	0.24	1.00
$-LL$	1128.29	1057.28	168.48	243.95

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42	Experience good only for 1st round		R.Slonim, “Competing Against Experienced and Inexperienced Players,” Experimental Economics ,Vol.8, (2005), pp.65-66. 依據著作權法第 46 、 52 、 65 條合理使用
44	Level-0: Random play …Worldly: BR to distribution of Level-0, Level-1 and Nash types		D.Stahl & Paul Wilson, “On Player’s Models of Other Players: Theory and Experimental Evidence,” Games and Economic Behavior, Vol.10,(1995), 218-224 依據著作權法第 46 、 52 、 65 條合理使用
45	Table IV Parameter Estimates and Confidence Intervals for Mixture Model		D.Stahl & Paul Wilson, “On Player’s Models of Other Players: Theory and Experimental Evidence,” Games and Economic Behavior, Vol.10,(1995), 241. 依據著作權法第 46 、 52 、 65 條合理使用
46	-18 2-player NF games designed to separate: -Naive (L1), Altruistic (max sum) …-Equilibrium (pl		Costa-Gomes, et.al, “Cognition and Behavior in Normal Form Games: An Experimental Study,”Econometrica, Vol.69, No.5, (2001), pp.1193-1200. 依據著作權法第 46 、 52 、 65 條合理使用

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<tr><th>頁碼</th><th>作品</th><th>版權標示</th><th>來源 / 作者</th></tr>
<tr><td>48</td><td>Consistency of Strategies with Iterated Dominance
…computationally difficult, but unnatural.</td><td></td><td>Costa-Gomes, et.al, “Cognition and Behavior in Normal Form Games: An Experimental Study,”Econometrica, Vol.69, No.5, (2001), pp.1216.
依據著作權法第 46 、 52 、 65 條合理使用</td></tr>
<tr><td>49</td><td><table>
<tr><th>Rule</th><th>E(u)</th><th>Choice (%)</th><th>Choice+Lookup (%)</th></tr>
<tr><td>Altruistic</td><td>17.11</td><td>8.9</td><td>2.2</td></tr>
<tr><td>Pessimistic</td><td>20.93</td><td>0</td><td>4.5</td></tr>
<tr><td>Naïve</td><td>21.38</td><td>22.7</td><td>44.8</td></tr>
<tr><td>Optimistic</td><td>21.38</td><td>0</td><td>2.2</td></tr>
<tr><td>L2</td><td>24.87</td><td>44.2</td><td>44.1</td></tr>
<tr><td>D1</td><td>24.13</td><td>19.5</td><td>0</td></tr>
<tr><td>D2</td><td>23.95</td><td>0</td><td>0</td></tr>
<tr><td>Equilibrium</td><td>24.19</td><td>5.2</td><td>0</td></tr>
<tr><td>Sophisticated</td><td>24.93</td><td>0</td><td>2.2</td></tr>
</table></td><td></td><td>Costa-Gomes, et.al, “Cognition and Behavior in Normal Form Games: An Experimental Study,”Econometrica, Vol.69, No.5, (2001), pp.1209&1229.
依據著作權法第 46 、 52 、 65 條合理使用</td></tr>
<tr><td>50</td><td><table>
<tr><th rowspan="2">Subject / Rule</th><th colspan="2">↕ own payoff</th><th colspan="2">↔ other payoff</th></tr>
<tr><th>Predicted</th><th>Actual</th><th>Predicted</th><th>Actual</th></tr>
<tr><td>TS (Equil.)</td><td>>31</td><td>63.3</td><td>>31</td><td>69.3</td></tr>
<tr><td>Equilibrium</td><td>>31</td><td>21.5</td><td>>31</td><td>79.0</td></tr>
<tr><td>Naive/Opt.</td><td><31</td><td>21.1</td><td>-</td><td>48.3</td></tr>
<tr><td>Altruistic</td><td><31</td><td>21.1</td><td>-</td><td>60.0</td></tr>
<tr><td>L2</td><td>>31</td><td>39.4</td><td>=31</td><td>30.3</td></tr>
<tr><td>D1</td><td>>31</td><td>28.3</td><td>>31</td><td>61.7</td></tr>
</table></td><td></td><td>Costa-Gomes, et.al, “Cognition and Behavior in Normal Form Games: An Experimental Study,”Econometrica, Vol.69, No.5, (2001), pp.1229.
依據著作權法第 46 、 52 、 65 條合理使用</td></tr>
<tr><td>51</td><td>Information Search Patterns
…H-M-L: % of Adjacency | 100% occurrence</td><td></td><td>Costa-Gomes, et.al, “Cognition and Behavior in Normal Form Games: An Experimental Study,”Econometrica, Vol.69, No.5, (2001), pp.1229-1232
依據著作權法第 46 、 52 、 65 條合理使用</td></tr>
</table>

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52	Table V Aggregate Rates of Compliance		Costa-Gomes, et.al, “Cognition and Behavior in Normal Form Games: An Experimental Study,”Econometrica, Vol.69, No.5, (2001), pp.1231. 依據著作權法第 46 、 52 、 65 條合理使用
53	Poisson distribution of level-k thinkers $f(k\|\tau)$ …Belief about others is Truncated Poisson		Colin Camerer, et.al, “A Cognitive Hierarchy of Games,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, (2004), 863-866 依據著作權法第 46 、 52 、 65 條合理使用
54	-2-Person Guessing Games (*p*-beauty contest) ….Target1 x Target2 < 1: Nash lower bounds		M.A.Costa-Gomes& V.P. Crawford, “Cognition and Behavior in Two-Person Guessing Games: An Experimental Study,” American Economic Review, Vol.96, No.5, (2006), pp.1737-1740. 依據著作權法第 46 、 52 、 65 條合理使用
55	-16 Different Games -Limits: ….-No feedback –		M.A.Costa-Gomes& V.P. Crawford, “Cognition and Behavior in Two-Person Guessing Games: An Experimental Study,” American Economic Review, Vol.96, No.5, (2006), pp.1743.

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56	Define Various Types: Equilibrium (EQ): BR to Nash (play Nash) …L3: BR to L2		M.A.Costa-Gomes& V.P. Crawford, “Cognition and Behavior in Two-Person Guessing Games: An Experimental Study,” American Economic Review, Vol.96, No.5, (2006), pp.1762. 依據著作權法第 46 、 52 、 65 條合理使用
57	Dominance types… …-See if anyone has a *transcended* understanding of …		M.A.Costa-Gomes& V.P. Crawford, “Cognition and Behavior in Two-Person Guessing Games: An Experimental Study,” American Economic Review, Vol.96, No.5, (2006), pp.1738-1739. 依據著作權法第 46 、 52 、 65 條合理使用
58	(table below)		M.A.Costa-Gomes& V.P. Crawford, “Cognition and Behavior in Two-Person Guessing Games: An Experimental Study,” American Economic Review, Vol.96, No.5, (2006), pp.1751.. 依據著作權法第 46 、 52 、 65 條合理使用
59	43 (out of 88) subjects in the baseline made exact guesses (+/- 0.5) in 7 or more games Distribution: (L1, … = (20, 12, 3, 8)		M.A.Costa-Gomes& V.P. Crawford, “Cognition and Behavior in Two-Person Guessing Games: An Experimental Study,” American Economic Review, Vol.96, No.5, (2006), pp.1741.. 依據著作權法第 46 、 52 、 65 條合理使用

Game	L1	L2	L3	D1	D2	EQ	SOPH
14. β4γ2	600	525	630	600	611.25	750	630
6. δ3γ4	520	650	650	617.5	650	650	650
7. δ3δ3	780	900	900	838.5	900	900	900
11. δ2β3	350	546	318.5	451.5	423.15	300	420
16. α4α2	450	315	472.5	337.5	341.25	500	375
1. α2β1	350	105	122.5	122.5	122.5	100	122
15. α2α4	210	315	220.5	227.5	227.5	350	262
13. γ2β4	350	420	367.5	420	420	500	420
5. γ4δ3	500	500	500	500	500	500	500
4. γ2β1	350	300	300	300	300	300	300
10. α4β1	500	225	375	262.5	262.5	150	300
8. δ3δ3	780	900	900	838.5	900	900	900
12. β3δ2	780	455	709.8	604.5	604.5	390	695
3. β1γ2	200	175	150	200	150	150	162
2. β1α2	150	175	100	150	100	100	132
9. β1α4	150	250	112.5	162.5	131.25	100	187

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<tr><td>59</td><td>
<table>
<tr><td colspan="6">TABLE 1—SUMMARY OF BASELINE AND OB SUBJECTS' ESTIMATED TYPE DISTRIBUTIONS</td></tr>
<tr><th>Type</th><th>Apparent from guesses</th><th>Econometric from guesses</th><th>Econometric from guesses, excluding random</th><th>Econometric from guesses, with specification test</th><th>Econometric from guesses and search, with specification test</th></tr>
<tr><td>L1</td><td>20</td><td>43</td><td>37</td><td>27</td><td>29</td></tr>
<tr><td>L2</td><td>12</td><td>20</td><td>20</td><td>17</td><td>14</td></tr>
<tr><td>L3</td><td>3</td><td>3</td><td>3</td><td>1</td><td>1</td></tr>
<tr><td>D1</td><td>0</td><td>5</td><td>3</td><td>1</td><td>0</td></tr>
<tr><td>D2</td><td>0</td><td>0</td><td>0</td><td>0</td><td>0</td></tr>
<tr><td>Eq.</td><td>8</td><td>14</td><td>13</td><td>11</td><td>10</td></tr>
<tr><td>Soph.</td><td>0</td><td>3</td><td>2</td><td>1</td><td>1</td></tr>
<tr><td>Unclassified</td><td>45</td><td>0</td><td>10</td><td>30</td><td>33</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="6">Note: The far-right-hand column includes 17 OB subjects classified by their econometric-from-guesses type estimates.</td></tr>
</table></td><td></td><td>M.A.Costa-Gomes& V.P. Crawford, “Cognition and Behavior in Two-Person Guessing Games: An Experimental Study,” American Economic Review, Vol.96, No.5, (2006), pp.1741.
由所有人 Vincent P. Crawford & Miguel A. Costa-Gomes 授權，您如須利用本作品，請另行向權利人取得授權。</td></tr>
<tr><td>60</td><td>Deviation from Equilibrium is cognitive</td><td></td><td>M.A.Costa-Gomes& V.P. Crawford, “Cognition and Behavior in Two-Person Guessing Games: An Experimental Study,” American Economic Review, Vol.96, No.5, (2006), pp.1737-1738.
依據著作權法第 46 、 52 、 65 條合理使用</td></tr>
<tr><td>61</td><td>Pseudotypes: Constructed
…Pseudotype likelihoods high within, low
a) outside</td><td></td><td>M.A.Costa-Gomes& V.P. Crawford, “Cognition and Behavior in Two-Person Guessing Games: An Experimental Study,” American Economic Review, Vol.96, No.5, (2006), pp.1739-1740.
依據著作權法第 46 、 52 、 65 條合理使用</td></tr>
<tr><td>65</td><td>L1 best responds to L0 (with uniform errors)
-Lk best respon</td><td></td><td>V.Crawford & N.Iriberri, “Fatal Attraction: Salience, Naïveté, and Sophistication in Experimental “Hide-and-Seek” Games,” American Economic Review, Vol.97,No.5,</td></tr>
</table>

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頁碼	作品	版權標示	來源 / 作者
66	-L0 Hiders and Seekers are symmetric… Choice probabilities: (p/2, q, 1 - p - q, p/2) 		V.Crawford & N.Iriberri, “Fatal Attraction: Salience, Naïveté, and Sophistication in Experimental “Hide-and-Seek” Games,” American Economic Review, Vol.97.No.5, (2007),pp.1738. 依據著作權法第 46 、 52 、 65 條合理使用
67-74&76			V.Crawford & N.Iriberri, “Fatal Attraction: Salience, Naïveté, and Sophistication in Experimental “Hide-and-Seek” Games,” American Economic Review, Vol.97.No.5, (2007),pp.1739. 由所有人 Vincent P. Crawford & Nagore Iriberri 授權，您如須利用本作品，請另行向權利人取得授權。
75	Given L0 playing (p/2, q, 1 - p - q, p/2), ….-L4 Hiders and Seekers both avoid central A		V.Crawford & N.Iriberri, “Fatal Attraction: Salience, Naïveté, and Sophistication in Experimental “Hide-and-Seek” Games,” American Economic Review, Vol.97.No.5, (2007),pp.1738. 依據著作權法第 46 、 52 、 65 條合理使用
	Estimate on one		V.Crawford & N.Iriberri, “Fatal Attraction: Salience,

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79			Barry O'Neil, "Nonmetric Test of the Minimax Theory of Two-Person Zero Sum Games," Proceedings of the National Academy of Sicence, Vol.84, pp.2108. 依據著作權法第 46 、 52 、 65 條合理使用
80	*L0*: (*a*, (1-*a*-*j*)/2, (1-*a*-*j*)/2, *j*), *a*, *j*>¼ -…are more salient than 2 and 3…		V.Crawford & N.Iriberri, "Fatal Attraction: Salience, Naïveté, and Sophistication in Experimental "Hide-and-Seek" Games," American Economic Review, Vol.97.No.5, (2007),pp.1746. 依據著作權法第 46 、 52 、 65 條合理使用
81	(A, 2, 3, J) = (8%, 24%, 12%, 56%) for Player 1 (A, 2, 3, J) = (1 … %) for Play… 		V.Crawford & N.Iriberri, "Fatal Attraction: Salience, Naïveté, and Sophistication in Experimental "Hide-and-Seek" Games," American Economic Review, Vol.97.No.5, (2007),pp.1746. 依據著作權法第 46 、 52 、 65 條合理使用
82			John Nash, "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Vol.21, No.1, (Jan., 1953), pp136-137.

Image 1 table:

	1	2	3	J	MSE	Actual	QRE
1	-5	5	5	-5	0.2	0.221	0.213
2	5	-5	5	-5	0.2	0.215	0.213
3	5	5	-5	-5	0.2	0.203	0.213
J	-5	-5	-5	5	0.4	0.362	0.360
MSE	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.4			
Actual	0.226	0.179	0.169	0.426			
QRE	0.191	0.191	0.191	0.427			

Image 2: Table 5. Comparison of the Leading Models in O'Neill's Game